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Abstract
In this paper we use an economic model to analyse data from a major
social experiment, namely PROGRESA in Mexico, and to evaluate its
impact on school participation. In the process we also show the useful-
ness of using experimental data to estimate a structural economic model.
The evaluation sample includes data from villages where the program was
implemented and where it was not. The allocation was randomised for
evaluation purposes. We estimate a structural model of education choices
and argue that without such a framework it is impossible to evaluate the
eﬀect of the program and, especially, possible changes to its structure.
We also argue that the randomized component of the data allows us to
identify a more ￿exible model that is better suited to evaluate the pro-
gram. We ￿nd that the program has a positive eﬀect on the enrollment of
children, especially after primary school; this result is well replicated by
the parsimonious structural model. We also ￿nd that a revenue neutral
change in the program that would increase the grant for secondary school
children while eliminating for the primary school children would have a
substantially larger eﬀect on enrollment of the latter, while having minor
eﬀects on the former.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In 1998 the Mexican government started a remarkable new program in rural
localities. PROGRESA was one of the ￿rst and probably the most visible of
a new generation of interventions whose main aim is to improve the process
of human capital accumulation in the poorest communities by providing cash
transfers conditional on speci￿c types of behaviour in three key areas targeted
by the program: nutrition, health and education. Arguably the largest of the
three components of the program was the education one. Mothers in the poorest
households in a set of targeted villages are given grants to keep their children in
school. In the ￿rst version of the program, which has since evolved and is now
called Oportunidades, the grants started in third grade and increased until the
ninth and were conditional on school enrolment and attendance. PROGRESA
was noticeable and remarkable not only for the original design but also because,
when the program begun, the Mexican government started a rigorous evaluation
of its eﬀects.
The evaluation of PROGRESA is greatly helped by the existence of a high
quality data set whose collection was started at the outset of the program,
between 1997 and 1998. The PROGRESA administration identi￿ed 506 com-
munities that quali￿ed for the program and started the collection of a rich
longitudinal data set in these communities. Moreover, 186 of these communities
where randomized out of the program with the purpose of providing a control
group that would enhance the evaluation. However, rather than being excluded
from the program all together, in the control villages the program was postponed
for about two years, during which period, four waves of the panel were collected.
Within each community in the evaluation sample, all households, both bene￿-
2ciaries (i.e. the poorest) and non-bene￿ciaries, were covered by the survey. In
the control villages, it is possible to identify the would-be bene￿ciaries were the
program to be implemented.
By all accounts and evidence, the evaluation of PROGRESA, based on
the large randomized experiment described above, was highly successful (see
Schultz, 2003). Given the evaluation design, the program impacts could be es-
timated by comparing mean outcomes between treatment and control villages.
These estimates, on their own, can answer only a limited question (albeit with-
out relying on any parametric or functional form assumption), namely how did
the speci￿c program implemented in the experiment aﬀect the outcomes of in-
terest. However, policy may require answers to much more re￿ned questions,
such as extrapolating to diﬀerent groups or altering the parameters of the initial
program. Thus, one can think of using experimental variation and indeed de-
signing experiments to generate such variability so as to estimate more credibly
structural models capable of richer policy analysis. Our work draws from the
tradition of Orcutt and Orcutt (1968), who advocate precisely this approach,
which found an early expression in the work based on the negative income tax
experiments, such as in Burtless and Hausman (1978) and Moﬃtt (1979).
Thus, the aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of monetary incentives
on education choices in rural Mexico; to discuss eﬀective design of interven-
tions aimed at improving educational participation in developing countries; and
to illustrate the bene￿ts of combining randomised experiments with structural
models. To achieve these goals we estimate a simple structural model of educa-
tion choices using the data from the PROGRESA randomised experiment. We
then use the model to simulate the eﬀect of changes to some of the parameters
3of the program.
PROGRESA eﬀectively changes the relative price of education and child
labour in a controlled and exogenous fashion. A tightly parameterized model,
under suitable restrictions (see below) could be used, together with data on
wages and enrollment, to predict the eﬀect of the program even before its im-
plementation using variation in wages across communities where the program is
not available. This is the strategy followed, by Todd and Wolpin (2006). They
then use the experiment to validate their model, which they estimate using the
data from the control villages, as if no experiment ever took place. Their ap-
proach does not require experimental variation other than as a check for their
model. Thus, while both papers use the same data, the idea underlying the two
research programs is diﬀerent.1 Ultimately we believe that it is important to
try and use as much genuinely exogenous variation to identify structural rela-
tionships and designing or using existing experiments for this purpose is likely
to lead to important advances in structural modelling.
Like Todd and Wolpin (2006), we estimate a structural model, but our ap-
proach and objectives are diﬀerent. We use both treatment and control villages
exploiting the variation in the grant induced by the randomized experiment to
estimate a more ￿exible speci￿cation than could not be estimated without the
program: critically, we do not restrict the eﬀect of the grant to be the same
1There are also diﬀerences in the estimation approach.as well as in the speci￿cation of the
models between this paper and that of Todd and Wolpin. On the estimation side we exploit
the increasing availability of schooling as an instrument to control for the initial conditions
problem so as to better disentangle state dependence from unobserved heterogeneity. As
for the speci￿cation, Todd and Wolpin￿s model solves a family decision problem, including
tradeoﬀs between children and fertility, which we do not. What has informed our modelling
choices is the focus on using the incentives introduced by the programme in some localities to
identify in a credible fashion our model. Considering fertility eﬀects is potentially interesting.
However, it should be pointed out that the programme did not have any eﬀects on fertility.
Todd and Wolpin￿s model of fertility is identi￿ed only using the observed cross sectional
variation which may not necessarily re￿ect exogenous diﬀerences in incentives.
4as that of wages. While it is true that variation in the conditional grant has
an eﬀect similar to changes in child wages, as it modi￿es the relative price of
school versus work, it is plausible that the marginal utility of income diﬀers de-
pending on whether the child attends school or not; this is just a manifestation
of preferences being nonseparable in consumption and schooling. It is therefore
possible that the changes in the grant and in wages have diﬀerent eﬀects on
school enrollment. The experiment allows us to test whether this is the case
empirically and, if necessary, to relax this separability restriction. The point
is important because it adds a new dimension to the discussion of the role of
randomised experiments in designing policy. If indeed separability is rejected,
experimental variation is useful not only because of the exogenous variation that
it induces but also because it helps identify economic eﬀects that may otherwise
be unidenti￿able and that play a crucial role in the design of policy. Thus, the
structural model allows for a richer analysis of the experimental data and the
experimental data allows for a richer economic model to be estimated.
Our model is similar to that of Willis and Rosen (1979) where individuals
base their choice on comparing the costs and bene￿ts of additional schooling
depending on their comparative advantage. Our estimation approach is also
similar to that of a much simpli￿ed version of the model by Keane and Wolpin
(1997), although their problem is a more complete study of careers.
A study of this sort and a better understanding of the eﬀectiveness of such
a policy is important as de￿cits in the accumulation of human capital have
been identi￿ed by several commentators as one of the main reasons for the rela-
tively modest growth performance of Latin American economies in comparison,
for instance, with some of the South East Asian countries (see, for instance,
5Behrman, 1999, Behrman, Duryea and SzØkely, 1999,2000). For this reason,
the program we study and similar ones have received considerable attention in
Latin America.
As mentioned above, PROGRESA was randomized across localities, rather
across households. As these localities are isolated from each other, this ex-
perimental design also aﬀords the possibility of estimating general equilibrium
eﬀect induced by the program. Although some papers in the literature (see, for
instance, Angelucci and De Giorgi, 2009) have looked at the impact of PRO-
GRESA on some prices and other village level variables, perhaps surprisingly,
no study has considered, as far as we know, the eﬀe c tt h a tt h ep r o g r a mh a s
had on children wages. One could imagine that, if the program is eﬀective in
increasing school participation, a reduction in the supply of child labour could
result in an increase in children wages which, in turn, would result in an at-
tenuation of the program￿s impact. Here we estimate this impact (taking into
account the fact that children wages are observed only for the selected subset of
children who actually work) and establish that the program led to an increase
in child wages in the treatment municipalities, by decreasing the labour supply
of children. We incorporate these general equilibrium impacts within our model
a n di no u rs i m u l a t i o n s . 2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
main features of the program and of the evaluation survey we use. In section
3, we present some simple results on the eﬀectiveness of the program based on
the comparison of treatment and control villages and discuss the limitations of
this evidence. In section 4, we present a structural dynamic model of education
2The consideration of GE eﬀects constitutes yet another diﬀerence relative to Todd and
Wolpin (2006).
6choices and describe its various components. Section 5 brie￿y discusses the
estimation of the model. Section 6 presents the results we obtain from the
estimation of our model. We also report the results of a version of the model that
imposes the separability restriction used by Todd and Wolpin (2006). Section 7
uses the model to perform a number of policy simulations that could help to ￿ne-
tune the program. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper with some thoughts
about open issues and future research.
2 The PROGRESA program.
In 1997, the Mexican government started a large program to reduce poverty
in rural Mexico. The program proposed by the Zedillo administration was in-
novative in that introduced a number of incentives and conditions with which
participant households had to comply to keep receiving the program￿s bene￿ts.
When the program was started, the administration decided to collect a large
longitudinal survey with the scope of evaluating the eﬀectiveness of the pro-
gram, In this section, we describe the main features of the program and of the
evaluation survey.
2.1 The speci￿cs of the PROGRESA program
PROGRESA is the Spanish acronym for ￿Health, Nutrition and Education￿,
that are the three main areas of the program. PROGRESA is one of the ￿rst
and probably the best known of the so-called ￿conditional cash transfers￿, which
aim at alleviating poverty in the short run while at the same time fostering the
accumulation of human capital to reduce it in the long run. This is achieved
by transferring cash to poor households under the condition that they engage
in behaviours that are consistent with the accumulation of human capital: the
7nutritional subsidy is paid to mothers that register the children for growth
and development check ups and vaccinate them as well as attend courses on
hygiene, nutrition and contraception. The education grants are paid to mothers
if their school age children attend school regularly. Interestingly such conditional
cash transfers have become quite popular. In 1998 the British government has
piloted a similar program targeted to children aged 16-18 (see Dearden et al
2008). The program has received considerable attention and publicity. More
recently programs similar to and inspired by PROGRESA were implemented in
Colombia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Argentina, Brazil, Turkey and other countries.
Rawlings (2004) contains a survey of some of these programs. Skou￿as (2001)
provides additional details on PROGRESA and its evaluation.
PROGRESA is ￿r s tt a r g e t e da tt h el o c a l i t yl e v e l .I n1 9 9 7 ,an u m b e ro fp o o r
communities in rural Mexico were declared eligible for the program. Roughly
speaking, the two criteria communities had to satisfy to qualify for the program
were a certain degree of poverty (as measured by what is called an ￿index of
marginalization￿, basically the ￿rst principal component of a certain number
of village level variables routinely collected by the government) and access to
certain basic structures (schools and health centers). The reason for the second
criterion is the conditional nature of the program: without some basic structures
within a certain distance, bene￿ciary households could not comply with the
conditions for retaining the bene￿ciary status (participation in vaccination and
check-up visits for the health and nutrition components and school attendance
for the education component). As a consequence of these eligibility criteria the
PROGRESA communities, while poor, are not the poorest in Mexico.
Within each community, then the program is targeted by proxy means test-
8ing. Once a locality quali￿es, individual households could qualify or not for the
program, depending on a single indicator, once again the ￿rst principal compo-
nent of a number of variables (such as income, house type, presence of running
water, and so on). Eligibility was determined in two steps. First, a general cen-
sus of the PROGRESA localities measured the variables needed to compute the
indicator and each household was de￿ned as ￿poor￿ or ￿not-poor￿ (where ￿poor￿
is equivalent to eligibility). Subsequently, in March 1998, an additional survey
was carried out and some households were added to the list of bene￿ciaries.
This second set of bene￿ciary households are called ￿densi￿cados￿. Fortunately,
the re-classi￿cation survey was operated both in treatment and control towns.
The largest component of the program is the education one. Bene￿ciary
households with school age children receive grants conditional on school at-
tendance. The size of the grant increases with the grade and, for secondary
education, is slightly higher for girls than for boys. In Table 1, we report the
grant structure. All the ￿gures are in current pesos, and can be converted in US
dollars at approximately an exchange rate of 10 pesos per dollar. In addition
to the (bi) monthly payments, bene￿ciaries with children in school age receive
a small annual grant for school supplies.
For logistic and budgetary reasons, the program was phased in slowly but
is currently very large. In 1998 it was started in less than 10,000 localities.
However, at the end of 1999 it was implemented in more than 50,000 localities
and had a budget of about US$777 million or 0.2% of Mexican GDP. At that
time, about 2.6 million households, or 40% of all rural families and one ninth
of all households in Mexico, were included in the program. Subsequently the
program was further expanded and, in 2002-2003 was extended to some urban
9areas.
The program represents a substantial help for the bene￿ciaries. The nu-
tritional component of 100 pesos per month (or 10 US dollars) in the second
semester of 1998, corresponded to 8% of the bene￿ciaries￿ income in the evalu-
ation sample.
As mentioned above, the education grants are conditional to school enrol-
ment and attendance of children, and can be cumulated within a household up
to a maximum of 625 pesos (or 62.5 dollars) per month per household or 52% of
the average bene￿ciary￿s income. The average grant per household in the sam-
ple we use was 348 pesos per month for households with children and 250 for
all bene￿ciaries or 21% of the bene￿ciaries income. To keep the grant, children
have to attend at least 85% of classes. Upon not passing a grade, a child is still
entitled to the grant for the same grade. However, if the child fails the grade
again, it looses eligibility.
2.2 The evaluation sample
Before starting the program, the agency running it decided to start the collection
of a large data set to evaluate its eﬀectiveness. Among the bene￿ciaries localities,
506 where chosen randomly and included in the evaluation sample. The 1997
survey was supplemented, in March 1998, by a richer survey in these villages,
located in 7 of the 31 Mexican states. All households in these villages where
interviewed, for a total of roughly 25,000 households. Using the information
of the 1997 survey and that in the March 1998 survey, each household can be
classi￿ed as poor or non-poor, that is, each household can be identi￿ed as being
10PROGRESA bi-monthly monetary bene￿ts
Type of bene￿t 1998 1st sem. 1998 2nd sem. 1999 1st sem. 1999 2nd sem
Nutrition support 190 200 230 250
Primary school
3 130 140 150 160
4 150 160 180 190
5 190 200 230 250
6 260 270 300 330
secondary school
1st year
boys 380 400 440 480
girls 400 410 470 500
2nd year
boys 400 400 470 500
girls 440 470 520 560
3rd year
boys 420 440 490 530
girls 480 510 570 610
maximum support 1,170 1,250 1,390 1,500
Table 1: The PROGRESA grants
entitled or not to the program.
One of the most interesting aspects of the evaluation sample is the fact that
it contains a randomization component. The agency running PROGRESA used
the fact that, for logistic reasons, the program could not be started everywhere
simultaneously, to allocate randomly the villages in the evaluation sample to
￿treatment￿ and ￿control￿ groups. In particular, in 320 randomly chosen villages
of the evaluation sample were assigned to the communities where the program
started early, that is in May 1998. The remaining 186 villages were assigned to
the communities where the program started almost two years later (December
1999 rather than May 1998).
An extensive survey was carried out in the evaluation sample: after the initial
data collection between the end of 1997 and the beginning of 1998, an additional
4 instruments were collected in November 1998, March 1999, November 1999
11and April 2000. Within each village in the evaluation sample, the survey covers
all the households and collects extensive information on consumption, income,
transfers and a variety of other variables. For each household member, including
each child, there is information about age, gender, education, current labour
supply, earnings, school enrolment, and health status. The household survey is
supplemented by a locality questionnaire that provides information on prices of
various commodities, average agricultural wages (both for males and females)
as well as institutions present in the village and distance of the village from the
closest primary and secondary school (in kilometers and minutes).
In what follows we make an extensive use of both the household and the
locality survey. In particular, we use the household questionnaire to get infor-
mation on each child￿s age, completed last grade, school enrolment, parental
background, state of residence, school costs. We use the locality questionnaire
to get information on distance from schools and prevailing wages.
At the time of the 1997 survey, each household in the treatment and control
villages was de￿ned either as eligible or non eligible. Subsequently, in March
1998 before the start of the program, some of the non-eligible household were
re-classi￿ed as eligible. However, a considerable fraction of the newly eligible
households, due to administrative delays, did not start receiving the program
until much later. In some of the results we present below, we distinguish these
households. In the estimation of the structural model we consider as bene￿ciary
a household that actually receives the program.
123 Measuring the impact of the program: treat-
ment versus control villages.
As PROGRESA was assigned randomly between treatment and control villages
during the expansion phase of the program, it is straightforward to use the
evaluation sample to estimate the impact of the conditional cash transfers on
school enrolment. Randomization implies that control and treatment sample
are statistically identical and estimates of program impacts can be obtained by
a simple comparison of means. However, such an exercise estimates the impact
of the program as a whole, without specifying the mechanisms through which
it operates.
The availability of baseline, pre-program data, allows one to check whether
the evaluation sample is balanced between treatment and control groups both
in terms of pre-program outcomes and in terms of other observable background
characteristics. This exercise was performed by Behrman and Todd (1999), who
explored a wide range of variables at baseline. The data includes information
on programme eligibility for both treatment and control villages at baseline.
This allows us to make the comparisons separately for eligible and non-eligible
households. Behrman and Todd (1999) indicate that, by and large, the treat-
ment and control samples are very well balanced. However, and annoyingly,
t h e r es e e mt ob es o m ep r e - p r o g r a md i ﬀerences in school enrolment among non
eligible households. While it is not clear why such a diﬀerence arises, it might
be important to control for these initial diﬀerences when estimating impacts.
In this section, we present some estimates of the impact of PROGRESA on
school enrolment. These impacts have been widely studied: the IFPRI (2000)
report estimates of program impacts on a wide set of outcomes, while Schultz
13(2003) presents a complete set of results on the impact of the program on school
enrolment, which are substantially similar to those presented here. Here our
focus is on some aspects of the data that are pertinent to our model and to the
sample we use to estimate it. And more importantly, by describing the impacts
of the program in the sample we use to estimate our structural model, we set
the mark against which it will be ￿tted.
As our structural model will be estimated on boys, we report only the results
for them. The eﬀects for girls are slightly higher but not substantially diﬀerent
from those reported here for boys. As we will be interested in how the eﬀect
of the grant varies with age, we also report the results for diﬀerent age groups,
although when we consider individual ages, some of the estimates are quite
imprecise.
In Table 2 we report the estimated impact for the boys of each age obtained
comparing treatment and control villages in October 1998. In the last two rows,
we also report the average impacts on boys aged 12 to 15 (which is an age group
on which Todd and Wolpin (2006) focus) and on boys aged 10 to 16, that is our
entire sample. In the ￿rst column of the Table, we report enrolment rates among
eligible (as of 1997) boys in control villages. In the second column, we show the
estimated impacts obtained for boys from households that were declared eligible
in 1997 (poor 97). In the third column, we report the results for the boys in all
eligible households, including those reclassi￿ed in March 1998. Finally, in the
third column, we report the impacts on the non-eligible children.
The experimental impacts show that the eﬀect of the PROGRESA program
on enrolment has a marked inverted U shape. The program impact is small and
not signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero at age 10. It increases considerably past
14age 10, to peak at age 14, where our point estimates indicates an impact of 14
percentage points on boys whose households were classi￿ed as eligible in 1997.
The impact then declines for higher ages, probably a consequence of the fact
that the grant was not available, in the ￿rst version of the program, past grade
9. The average impact for the boys in our sample (aged 10 to 16) is about 5
percentage point, while for the boys aged 12 to 15 is, on average, as high as
6.6%.
The impact on the households classi￿ed as poor in 1997 is slightly higher than
on all eligible households, probably a re￿ection that the impact might be higher
for poorer families and the fact that, some of the families that were reclassi￿ed
as eligible in March 1998 (after being classi￿ed as non eligible in 1997), did not
receive the program immediately, due to administrative diﬃculties.
A surprising feature of Table 2 is the measured impact on non eligible chil-
dren. Although noisy, the estimates for some age groups indicate a large impact
on non-eligible boys. Indeed, for the age group 12-15, the eﬀect is even larger
than for the eligible children, at almost 8%. While one could think of the pos-
sibility of spill-over eﬀects that would generate positive eﬀects on non-eligible
children, the size of the impacts we measure in Table 2 is such that this type of
explanation is implausible. As we mentioned above, however, if one compares
school enrolment rates in 1997 between treatment and control villages, one ￿nds
that, among non-eligible households, they are signi￿cantly higher (statistically
and substantially) in treatment villages than in control villages. This is partic-
ularly so for children aged 12 to 17. Instead, enrolment rates in 1997 among
eligible children, are statistically identical in treatment and control villages. It
is therefore possible that the observed diﬀerence in enrolment rates among non-
15eligible households is driven by pre-existing diﬀerences between treatment and
control towns.
The reason for the diﬀerence in enrolment rates among boys (and girls)
in non eligible households between treatment and control villages is not clear.
Within our structural model, we account for it by considering one speci￿cation
which incorporates an unobserved cost component for non-eligible households
in control villages. As for measuring the eﬀect of the program as in Table 2,
one can use the 1997 data to obtain a diﬀerence in diﬀerence estimates of its
impacts. We report the results of such an exercise in Table 6 in the Appen-
dix. In this table, the pattern of the impacts among eligible children is largely
unaﬀected (as to be expected given the lack of signi￿cant diﬀerences between
treatment and control villages at baseline for these children). The impacts on
the non-eligible children, however, become insigni￿cant. This evidence justi￿es
the interpretation of the evidence in the last column of Table 2 as being caused
by pre-existing unobservable diﬀerences for non eligible children and justi￿es
our use of a ￿non eligible control￿ dummy in our empirical speci￿cation.
4 The model
We use a simple dynamic school participation model. Each child, (or his/her
parents) decide whether to attend school or to work taking into account the
economic incentives involved with such choices. Parents are assumed here to
act in the best interest of the child and consequently we do not admit any
interactions between children. We assume that children have the possibility
16Diﬀerence estimates of the impact of PROGRESA
on boys school enrolment


































































Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the locality level.
Table 2: Experimental Results October 1998
17of going to school up to age 17. All formal schooling ends by that time. In
the data, almost no individuals above age 17 are in school. We assume that
children who go to school do not work and vice-versa. We also assume that
children necessarily choose one of these two options. If they decide to work they
receive a village/education/age speci￿c wage. If they go to school, they incur
a (utility) cost (which might depend on various observable and unobservable
characteristics) and, with a certain probability, progress a grade. At 18, every-
body ends formal schooling and reaps the value of schooling investments in the
form of a terminal value function that depends on the highest grade passed.
The PROGRESA grant is easily introduced as an additional monetary reward
to schooling, that would be compared to that of working.
The model we consider is dynamic for two main reasons. First, the fact
that one cannot attend regular school past age 17 means that going to school
now provides the option of completing some grades in the future: that is a six
year old child who wants to complete secondary education has to go to school
(and pass the grade) every single year, starting from the current. This source
of dynamics becomes particularly important when we consider the impact of
the PROGRESA grants, since children,as we saw above, are only eligible for six
grades: the last three years of primary school and the ￿rst three of secondary.
Going through primary school (by age 14), therefore, also ￿buys￿ eligibility for
the secondary school grants. Second, we allow for state dependence: The number
of years of schooling aﬀects the utility of attending in this period. We explicitly
address the initial conditions problem that arises from such a consideration
and discuss the related identi￿cation issues at length below. State dependence
is important because it may be a mechanism that reinforces the eﬀect of the
18grant.
Before discussing the details of the model it is worth mentioning that using
a structural approach allows us to address the issue of anticipation eﬀects and
the assumptions required for their identi￿cation. PROGRESA as well as other
randomized experiments or pilot studies create a control group by delaying
the implementation of the program in some areas, rather than excluding them
completely. It is therefore possible that the control villages react to the program
prior to its implementation, depending on the degree to which they believe they
will eventually receive it. A straight comparison between treatment and control
areas may then underestimate the impact of the program. A structural model
that exploits other sources of variation, such as the variation of the grant with
age may be able to estimate the extent of anticipation eﬀects. We investigated
this with our model by examining its ￿t under diﬀerent assumptions about
when the controls are expecting to receive payment. As it turns out we ￿nd no
evidence of anticipation eﬀects in our data. This is not surprising because there
was no explicit policy announcing the future availability of the grants. The
a b s e n c eo fe v i d e n c eo na n t i c i p a t i o ne ﬀects, however, is consistent both with no
information about the future availability of the program and with an inability to
take advantage of future availability due, for instance, to liquidity constraints.
4.1 Instantaneous utilities from schooling and work
The version of the model we use assumes linear utility. In each period, going
to school involves instantaneous pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs, in addition
to losing the opportunity of working for a wage. The current bene￿ts come
from the utility of attending school and possibly, as far as the parents are
concerned, by the child-care services that the school provides during the working
19day. As mentioned above, the bene￿ts are also assumed to be a function of past
attendance. The costs of attending school are the costs of buying books etc.
as well as clothing items such as shoes. There are also transport costs to the
extent that the village does not have a secondary school. For households who
are entitled to PROGRESA and live in a treatment village, going to school
involves receiving the grade and gender speci￿cg r a n t .
As we are using a single cross section, we use the notation t to signify the
age of the child in the year of the survey. Variables with a subscript t may
be varying with age. Denote the utility of attending school for individual i in
period t who has already attended edit years as us
it.We posit:
us
it = Y s
it + αgit (1)
Y s
it = µs
i + as0zit + bsedit +1 ( pit =1 ) β
px
p




where git is the amount of the grant an individual is entitled to and it will be
equal to zero for non-eligible individuals and for control localities. Y s
it represents
the remaining pecuniary and non pecuniary costs or gains that one gets from
t og o i n gt os c h o o l . zit is a vector of taste shifter variables, including parental
background, age and state dummies. The variable 1(pit =1 )denotes attendance




it represent factors aﬀecting the costs of attending primary
school and secondary school respectively. The term εs
it represents an extreme
value error term which is assumed independently and identically distributed over
time and individuals Notice that the presence of edit introduces an important
element of dynamics we alluded to above: schooling choices aﬀect future grades
20and, therefore, the utility cost of schooling. Finally, the term µs
i represents
unobservables which we assume have a constant impact over time.3
The utility of not attending school is denoted by
uw
it = Y w
it + δwit (2)
Y w
it = µw
i + aw0zit + bwedit + εw
it
where wit are (potential) earnings when out of school. The wage is a function
(estimated from data) of age and education attainment as well as village of res-
idence that we discuss below. Notice that, while the grant involves a monetary
payment, just like the wage, we allow the coeﬃcient on the two variables to be
diﬀerent, possibly re￿ecting disutility from work. On the other hand, we can
only identify the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients on the variables that enter
both the utility of work and that of school. We can therefore, without loss of
generality, re-write equations 1 and 2 as follows:
us
it = γδgit + µi + a0zit + bedit +1 ( pit =1 ) β
px
p
it +1 ( sit =1 ) β
sxs
it + εit (3)
uw
it = δwit (4)
where a = as−aw,b= bs−bw,γ= α/δ, µi = µs
i −µw
i ,ε it = εs
it−εw
it. The error
term εit,t h ed i ﬀerence between two extreme value distributed random variables
and as such is distributed as a logistic. We will assume that µi is a discrete
random variables whose points of support and probabilities will be estimated
empirically. Finally note that all time-varying exogenous variables are assumed
3We have employed a one factor model of unobserved heterogeneity, where the unobserv-
ables aﬀects only the costs of education. When we attempted a richer speci￿cation, allowing a
second factor to aﬀect the impact of the wage we got no improvement in the likelihood. There
would be other options such as allowing for heterogeneity in the discount factor. However,
in terms of ￿t, this is likely to act very much like the heterogeneous costs of education and
overall the model did not seem to require any further unobserved factors to ￿t the data.
21to be perfectly foreseen when individuals consider trade-oﬀs between the present
and the future.
The coeﬃcient γ measures the impact of the grant as a proportion of the
impact of the wage on the education decision. The grant (which is a function
of the school grade currently attended -as in Table 1) is suitably scaled so as
to be comparable to the wage. If γ =1 , the eﬀect of the grant on utility and
therefore on schooling choices, would be the same as that of the wage. In some
standard economic model they should have the same eﬀect. If this was the case,
the eﬀect of the program could be estimated even using data only from the
control communities in which it does not operate, from estimates of δ.T h i si s
the strategy used by Todd and Wolpin (2006). However, one can think of many
simple models in which there is every reason to expect that the impact of the
grant will be diﬀerent from that of the wage.
The issue can be illustrated easily within a simple static model. As in our
framework, we assume that utility depends on whether the child goes to school
or not. Moreover we assume that this decision aﬀects the budget constraint. In
particular we have:
Us = cs = Y + g (5)
Uw = θcw − α = θ(Y + w) − α
where cs and cw represent consumption conditional on the child going to school
or to work, respectively; Y is other sources of income, α is the disutility of work
and the parameter θ captures non-separabilities between consumption and child
labour; in other words it allows for the possibility that the marginal utility
22of income depends on whether the child is working or attending school. The
diﬀerence in utilities between school and work will then be given by:
Us − Uw =( 1− θ)Y + g − θw
From this equation we can see that only if θ =1the grant and the wage have
t h es a m ee ﬀect on the decision to go to school. The same reasoning generalizes,
af o r t i o r i , to a dynamic setting.
The reason for this non-separability may be just because of the structure of
preferences or because of the structure of intrahousehold decisions and alloca-
tions: PROGRESA cheques are actually handed out to the mother, while we
do not know who receives the child￿s wage. Depending on the age of the child,
wages are either received by the child or by one of the parents. Depending on
who receives it, a standard collective model will predict diﬀerent eﬀects because
the distribution of power will change in the household.4
Therefore, whether changes in the grant have the same eﬀect as changes in
child wages, is an empirical matter. Using the experiment we are able to test
whether the grant and the wage have the same eﬀect on school enrolment. The
design of the experiment allows us to address this important issue.
This leads us back to the inevitable comparison with the paper by Todd
and Wolpin (2006). Our approach has been to use the experiment to estimate
our model for two important reasons: ￿rst, to have a source of genuine exoge-
nous variation for the estimation of a structural model; second by using the
experimental variation we are able to estimate a model that allows for a richer
structure of preferences than is possible with standard observational data. In
4See Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005) on how spending on children depends on
individual preferences and relative bargaining power.
23addition, our approach also allows us to account for general equilibrium eﬀects,
using direct information of the impact of the experiment on wages. The points
just discussed distinguish our approach from that of Todd and Wolpin (2006).
By demonstrating the scope of combining experimental data with structural
models we hope to make it standard both to analyse experiments using struc-
tural models and to design experiments so as to enable the estimation of richer
models.
Our sample includes both eligible and ineligible individuals. Eligibility is
determined on the basis of a number of observable variables that might aﬀect
schooling costs and utility. To take into account the possibility of these system-
atic diﬀerences, we also include in equation 3 (among the z variables a dummy
for eligibility (which obviously is operative both in treatment and control local-
ities).
As we discussed in Section 3, there seems to be some diﬀerences in pre-
program enrolment rates between treatment and control localities. As we do
not have an obvious explanation for these diﬀerences, we use two alternative
strategies. First we control for them by adding to the equation for the schooling
utility (3) a dummy for treatment villages. Obviously such a dummy will absorb
some of the exogenous variability induced by the experiment. We discuss this
issue when we tackle the identi￿cation question in the next section. A less ex-
treme approach, justi￿ed by the fact that most of the unexplained diﬀerences in
pre-program enrollment is observed among non-eligible household, we introduce
a dummy for this group only.
244.2 Uncertainty
There are two sources of uncertainty in our model. The ￿rst is an iid shock to
schooling costs, modelled by the (logistic) random term εit. Given the structure
of the model, having a logistic error in the cost of going to school is equivalent
to having two extreme value errors, one in the cost of going to school and
one in the utility of work. Although the individual knows εit in the current
period,5 she does not know its value in the future. Since future costs will aﬀect
future schooling choices, indirectly they aﬀect current choices. Notice that the
term µi, while known (and constant) for the individual, is unobserved by the
econometrician.
The second source of uncertainty originates from the fact that the pupil may
not be successful in completing the grade. If a grade is not completed success-
fully, we assume that the level of education does not increase. We assume that
the probability of failing to complete a grade is exogenous and does not depend
on the willingness to continue schooling. We allow however this probability to
vary with the grade in question and with the age of the individual and we as-
sume it known to the individual.6 We estimate the probability of failure for
each grade as the ratio of individuals who are in the same grade as the year
before at a particular age. Since we know the completed grade for those not
attending school we include these in the calculation - this may be important
since failure may discourage school attendance. In the appendix we provide a
Table with our estimated probabilities of passing a grade.
5We could have introduced an additional residual term εw
it in equation 2. Because what
matters for the ￿t of the model is only the diﬀerence between the current (and future) utility
of schooling and working, assuming that both εit and εw
it were distributed as an extreme value
distribution is equivalent to assuming a single logistic residual.
6Since we estimate this probability from the data we could also allow for dependence on
other characteristics.
254.3 The return to education and the terminal value func-
tion
As mentioned above, after age 17, we assume individuals work and earn wages
depending on their level of education. In principle, one could try to measure the
returns to education investment from the data on the wages received by adults
in the village with diﬀerent level of educations. However, the number of choices
open to the individual after school include working in the village, migrating to
the closest town or even migrating to another state. Since we do not have data
that would allow us to model these choices (and schooling as a function of these)




where edi,18 is the education level achieved by age 18. The parameters α1 and
α2 of this function will be estimated alongside the other parameters of the model
and will be constrained to be non-negative.7 Implicit in this speci￿cation is the
assumption that the only thing that matters for lifetime values is the level of
education achieved. All other characteristics, which we include in the model,
are assumed to aﬀect the achieved level of education and not its return. Finally,
to check whether our estimate make sense we compare the implied returns to
e d u c a t i o nw i t ho b s e r v e dw a g ed i ﬀerentials in Mexico.
7We have used some information on urban and rural returns to education at the state level
along with some information on migration in each state to try to model such a relationship.
Unfortunately, we have no information on migration patterns and the data on the returns to
education are very noisy. This situation has motivated our choice of estimating the returns
to education that best ￿t our education choices.
264.4 Value functions
Since the problem is not separable overtime, schooling choices involve comparing
the costs of schooling now to its future and current bene￿ts. The latter are
intangible preferences for attending school including the potential child care
bene￿ts that parents may enjoy.
We denote by I ∈ {0,1} the random increment to the grade which results
from attending school at present. If successful, then I =1 , otherwise I =0 . We
denote the probability of success at age t for grade ed as ps
t(edit).
Thus the value of attending school for someone who has completed success-
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where the expectation is taken over the possible outcomes of the random shock
εit and where Υit is the entire set of variables known to the individual at period
t and aﬀecting preferences and expectations the costs of education and labour









The diﬀerence between the ￿rst terms of the two equations re￿ects the current
costs of attending, while the diﬀerence between the second two terms re￿ects the
future bene￿ts and costs of schooling. The parameter β represents the discount
factor. In practice, since we do not model savings and borrowing explicitly
this will re￿ect liquidity constraints or other factors that lead the households to
disregard more or less the future.
Given the terminal value function described above, these equations can be
used to compute the value of school and work for each child in the sample
27recursively. These formulae will be used to build the likelihood function used
to estimate the parameters of this model.
4.5 Wages and General Equilibrium Responses
Wages are the opportunity cost of education. In our model, an increase in wages
will reduce school participation. Since such wages may be determined within
the local labour market, they may also be aﬀected by the program because the
latter reduces the labour supply of children. These general equilibrium eﬀects
can be even more pronounced if child labour is not suﬃciently substitutable with
other types of labour. With our data we can estimate the eﬀect of the program
on wages and thus establish whether the change in the supply of labour does
indeed aﬀect them.
In what follows, we need to estimate a wage equation for three reasons. First,
we do not observe wages for children who are not working. Second, the dynamic
programming model requires the individual to predict future wages; this is done
on the basis of a model of wages perceived by the individual. Third, we wish
to test for general equilibrium eﬀects by estimating the eﬀect of the program
on wages. This is important because GE eﬀects can dampen the eﬀects of the
program.
We thus specify a standard Mincer type wage equation, where the wage of a
boy i living in community j determined by his age and education according to
lnwij = qj + a1agei + a2educi + ωij (6)
where qj represents the log price of human capital in the locality. We estimate
this wage equation separately from the rest of the model. We then use predic-
tions from this equation in place of actual wages. As far as future wages are
28concerned, this approach assumes that within our model individuals use these
predictions as point estimates of future wages and ignore any variance around
them. Given the amount of measurement error that is likely to be present in
wages this is a suitable assumption because the conditional variance will most
likely overestimate the amount of risk.8
We assume that education is exogenous for wages. We can support this
assumption with two pieces of evidence: ￿rst, as we shall show the relationship
between wages and education is extremely ￿at within the village. This is true for
both adults and children; given the limited occupations that one can undertake
in these rural communities this is not surprising. Indeed the returns to education
are obtained by migrating to urban centres once education is complete. Second
as we shall see there are no selection eﬀects on wages due to participation,
implying that despite the fact that unobserved ability is a determinant of school
participation (as we show later), it is unlikely to aﬀect child pay rates, which
are probably quite homogeneous.
Under these assumptions we could estimate the wage equation separately
using OLS and use the predictions in the model. However, we use a Heckman
(1979) selection correction approach that allows us to test that selection is not
an issue. To construct the inverse Mills ratio, which we include as a regressor in
the wage equation, we estimate a reduced form probit for school attendance as
a function of the variables we include in the structural model.9 These include
measures of the availability and cost of schools in the locality where the child
8There is well documented evidence that wages in surveys suﬀer from substantial mea-
surement error. With time series data and some further assumptions it is possible to identify
the variance of shocks to wages, at least in the absence of transitory shocks (see Meghir and
Pistaferri, 2004). However, with just one or two observations on individual wages over time
one cannot distinguish measurement error from wage shocks.
9Hence the discrete dependent variable is zero for work and 1 for school.
29lives, which controls among other for whether this is an experimental locality
or not.
Finally, we model qj in equation 6 as a function of the male agricultural wage
in the community and whether the program was implemented in that commu-
nity. The male agricultural wage acts as the exclusion restriction in the educa-
tion choice model that identi￿es the wage. The indicator for the PROGRESA
community measures the impact of the program on wages. The economic jus-
ti￿cation for both these variables is given below, following the presentation of
the estimates.
The resulting estimated wage equation for a boy i living in community j has
the form:
















where  ijt is the residual. We report in parentheses below the estimates of
the coeﬃcients their standard errors. Although the Mills ratio coeﬃcient has
t h ee x p e c t e ds i g n ,i m p l y i n gt h a tt h o s ew h og ot os c h o o lt e n dt oh a v el o w e r
wages, it is not signi￿cant, re￿ecting the probable fact that child labour is quite
homogeneous given age and education. The age eﬀect is signi￿cant and large as
expected. The eﬀect of education is very small and insigni￿cant, re￿ecting the
limited types of jobs available in these villages, as mentioned above.10 Thus the
key determinant of wages at the individual level is age. However, the coeﬃcients
on the community level adult wage (lnw
ag
j ) and the PROGRESA dummy (Pj)
10Overall the returns to education in Mexico are substantial, but they are obtained by the
adults migrating to urban centres. we expect the children who progress in education to leave
the village as adults so as to reap the bene￿ts.
30are economically and statistically signi￿cant. We now explain how they may
arise.
Let us suppose that production involves the use of adult and child labour
as well as other inputs and that the elasticity of substitution between the two
types of labour is given by ρ (ρ>0). Suppose also that the price of labour is
determined in the local labour market. Then in equilibrium the price of a unit
















In the above the γk > 0 (k = adult, child) are the adult and the child labour
supply elasticities respectively and the Lk (k = adult, child) represent the level
of labour supply of each group in the village.11 T h ef a c tt h a tt h ec o e ﬃcient on
the adult wage is smaller than one implies that the child labour supply elasticity
is larger than the adult one. The adult agricultural wage (w
ag
j )i sas u ﬃcient
statistic for the overall level of demand for goods in the local area and can thus
explain in part the price of human capital providing the necessary exclusion
restriction for identifying the wage eﬀect in the education choice model. The
term in square brackets in 8 is unobserved and re￿ects preferences for labour
supply and technology (ρ and κ). These will, in general, be correlated with
lnw
ag
j through the determination of local equilibrium. Identi￿cation requires us
to assume that Lchild/Ladult as well as technological parameters are constant
across localities, other than through the eﬀect of the program, which will shift
Lchild resulting in the general equilibrium eﬀects we are measuring. In other
words to identify the eﬀects of wages on schooling/labour supply we need to
11This expression for the wage has been derived using as labour supply Hk = Lkw
γk
k and
production function Q =
!
δHσ
child +( 1− δ)Hσ
adult
" 1
σ with σ =
ρ−1
ρ < 1,where ρ>0 is the
substitution elasticity.
31assume that wages vary because of diﬀerences in the demand for labour, as
re￿ected in lnw
ag
j and not because of diﬀerences in preferences that we do not
control for.12
We now turn to the eﬀect of the program. This is captured by the ￿treat-
ment￿ dummy Pj in equation (7), which decreases Lchild. This pushes up the
wage as a new local equilibrium is established. Our estimates imply that the
program decreased child labour (increased schooling) by 3.3% and increased
the wage rate by 6%, Taking into account that average participation is about
62% at baseline for our group, this implies an elasticity of wages with respect
to participation (labour supply) of about -1.2. Thus, allowing for the general
equilibrium eﬀect of the policy can be potentially important, particularly if ρ is
small.
4.6 Habits and Initial Conditions
T h ep r e s e n c eo fedit in equation 1 creates an important initial conditions prob-
lem because we do not observe the entire history of schooling for the children in
the sample as we use a single cross section. We cannot assume that the random
variable µi in equation 3 is independent of past school decisions as re￿ected in
the current level of schooling edit.
To solve this problem we specify a reduced form for educational attainment
up to the current date. We model the level of schooling already attained by
an ordered probit with index function h0
iζ + ξµi w h e r ew eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a t
the same heterogeneity term µi enters the prior decision multiplied by a loading
factor ξi. The ordered choice model allows for thresholds that change with age,
12This assumption is central to identifying wage eﬀects in the cross section and is implicit
in the Todd and Wolpin (2006) paper as well.
32and is thus more general that the standard speci￿cation; we use this as an
approximation to the sequential choices made before the program.13 The vector
hi includes variables re￿ecting past schooling costs such as the distance from the
closest secondary schools in pre-experimental years. Since school availability, as
measured by variables such as distance, changes over time, it can be used as an
instrument in the initial conditions model that is excluded from the subsequent
(current) attendance choice, which depends on the school availability during the
experiment. We write the probability of edit = e a n do fc h i l di attending school
as
P(edit = e,Attendit =1 |zit,x
p
it,x s









This will be the key component of the likelihood function presented below. The
endogeneity of the number of passed grades (the stock of schooling) is there-
fore captured by the common heterogeneity factor µi aﬀecting both decisions
The loading factor ξ governs the covariance between the two equations. It is
important to stress the role played in identi￿cation by the variables that cap-
ture lagged availability of schools as variables that enter the initial condition
equations but not the current participation equation.
5 Estimation
5.1 Identifying the eﬀect of the grant
Although we estimate our model by Maximum Likelihood, which we discuss
below, it is worthwhile discussing the exogenous variability in our data that
13See Cameron and Heckman (1998) and Cunha, Heckman and Vavarro (2007) on the
conditions under which a sequential dynamic optimisation problem can be represented as an
ordered choice model.
33drives our results. To estimate the eﬀect of the size of the grant on schooling
behaviour, an ideal experiment would have randomised the potential amounts
oﬀered across villages or even within villages. As it happens they did not. A
village either is in the program or not. Within each PROGRESA village those
classi￿ed as poor (about 70% of the population) are eligible for participation
in the program. To use the variation between eligibles, while allowing for the
eﬀects of wealth on schooling, we include a ￿non-poor￿ dummy.
The comparison between treatment and control villages and between eligible
and ineligible households within these villages can only identify the eﬀect of the
existence of the grant. However, the amount of the grant varies by the grade of
the child. The fact that children of diﬀerent ages attend the same grade oﬀers
a source of variation of the amount that can be used to identify the eﬀect of
the size of the grant. Given the demographic variables included in our model
and given our treatment for initial conditions this variation can be taken as
exogenous. Moreover, the way that the grant amount changes with grade varies
in a nonlinear way, which also helps identify the eﬀect.
Thus the eﬀect of the grant is identi￿ed by comparing across treatment and
control villages; by comparing across eligible and ineligible households (having
controlled for being ￿non-poor￿); and by comparing across diﬀerent ages within
and between grades. This is our basic model. We also estimate a version of the
model where we allow for diﬀerent bahaviour by the ineligible individuals in the
control and treatment villages. We do this by including in our model the ￿non-
poor￿ dummy interacted with being in a treatment village. This leaves the other
sources of variation in the grant as identifying information. The motivation for
the introduction of this additional dummy is twofold: ￿rst, as we documented
34above, there were some pre-program diﬀerences between the ineligibles in the
PROGRESA and the control villages. Second, there may be spillover eﬀects of
the program aﬀecting the behaviour of ineligible individuals, which would mean
that they behave diﬀerently from those in the control villages.14
Alternatively, the eﬀect of the grant could be estimated imposing more struc-
ture on the data and ignoring the variation induced by the presence of the ex-
periment. One could assume, for instance, separability between child labour
and consumption and infer the eﬀect of the grant from the observed response
of schooling to child wages. We come back to this issue below.
5.2 The Likelihood Function
We estimate the model by maximum likelihood.15 Denote by F(•) the distrib-
ution of the iid preference shock εit, assumed logistic. Assume the distribution
of unobservables µi is independent of all observables in the population and ap-
proximate it by a discrete distribution with M points of support sm each with
probability pm, all of which need to be estimated (Heckman and Singer, 1984).
The joint probability of attendance and having already achieved e years of ed-
14see Angelucci and DeGiorgi (2009) fo evidence on spillover eﬀects in consumption. If the
diﬀerences were due to GE eﬀects through wages we already account for these.
15To achieve the maximum we combine a grid search for the discount factor with a Gauss
Newton method for the rest of the parameters. We did this because often in dynamic models
the discount factor is not well determined. However in our case the likelifood function had
plenty of curvature around the optimal value and there was no diﬃculty in identifying the
optimum.
35ucation (edit = e) c a nt h e nb ew r i t t e na s
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(10)
The probability of attending school conditional on µi and edit = e is given by
the F(•); the expectations inside the probability are taken over future uncertain
realizations of the shock εit and the success of passing a grade; the sum is taken
over all points of support of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. The
expressions for the value functions at subsequent ages are computed recursively
starting from age 18 and working backwards until the current age using the
formulae in Section 4.4. The logistic assumption on the εit allows us to derive
a closed form expression for the terms in equation 10
We should stress that the wage we use in the estimation is the value predicted
by equation 7 (with the exclusion of the Mills ratio). Such an equation accounts
for endogenous selection and takes into account the eﬀect that PROGRESA had
on child wages, so that it imputes a higher values for treatment villages.16




{Di logPi +( 1− Di)log(1− Pi)} (11)
where Di =1denotes a school attendee in the sample of N children.
16We do not correct the standard errors to take into account that the wage is a generated
regressor.
366 Estimation results
In this section, we report the results we obtain estimating diﬀerent versions of
the dynamic programming model we discussed above. In particular we will be
discussing three diﬀerent versions of the model. The ￿rst constitutes our basic
model. In the second, we control for the pre-program diﬀerence in enrolment
rates among non eligible individuals in treatment and control villages with a
dummy in the speci￿cation for schooling costs that identi￿es the group of non
eligible boys in treatment villages. Finally, we present the estimates obtained
￿tting a version of our model where we impose the separability assumption used
by Todd and Wolpin (2006) to the boys in control towns only.
In Tables 3 to 5, we present, in Columns A and B, estimates of the two
versions of the basic model we mentioned above: the ￿r s tc o l u m no fe a c ht a b l e
refers to the version that ignores diﬀerences in pre-program school enrollment
between treatment and control villages, while in the second they are accounted
for by a dummy for non-eligible households in treatment localities. This dummy
does not have a signi￿cant eﬀect in the initial conditions equation (Table 4) but
is signi￿cant in the structural model of educational participation (Table 5). The
two degree of freedom likelihood ratio test has a p-value of 0.8%. However, the
parameters hardly change when we move between the two speci￿cations and the
substantive implications of the two models are the same.
T h et h i r dc o l u m ni nt h eT a b l e sp r e s e nts estimates of the model obtained
from the control sample only. In this case, the experiment is not used to estimate
the model and all incentive eﬀects are captured by the wage, which acts as the
opportunity cost of education. This model could be estimated on any standard
observational data set including the type of information we use. The purpose of
37estimating this model is to compare the predictions of a model estimated using
the experiment to one that does not. We return to this issue later.
For all speci￿cations the discount factor was estimated to be 0.89. The
standard errors we report are conditional on this value. This value was obtained
from a (rather coarse) grid search over several values, for our favourite version
of the model.17
We estimate all the versions of the model on the sample of boys older than
9 and younger than 17. All speci￿cations include, both in the initial conditions
equation and in the cost of education equation, state dummies, whose estimates
are not reported for the sake or brevity. In addition, we have variables re￿ecting
parental education (the excluded groups are heads and spouses with less than
completed primary) and parents￿ ethnicity. We also include the distance from
secondary school as well as the cost of attending such school, which in some cases
includes fees. Finally all speci￿cations include a dummy (poor) for programme
eligibility (potential if in a control village). This is, eﬀectively, just a measure
of wealth.
As mentioned above, we allow for unobserved heterogeneity that is modelled
as a discrete variable with three points of support. The same variable enters,
with diﬀerent loading factors, both the utility of going to school equation and
the initial condition equations. Such a variable, therefore, plays an important
role in that it allows for a ￿exible speci￿cation of unobserved heterogeneity
and determines the degree of correlation between the utility of schooling and
completed schooling, which, by entering the equation for the current utility of
schooling, introduces an important dynamic eﬀect into the model. We therefore
17It turns out that approximately the same value of the discount factor maximizes the
Likelihood Function both in Column 1 and Column 2 of our tables.
38start reporting, in Table 3, the estimates of the points of support of the un-
observed heterogeneity terms, and that of the loading factor of the unobserved
heterogeneity terms in the initial condition equation. Three points of support
seemed to be enough to capture the heterogeneity in our sample.
We ￿rst notice that the results do not vary much across the ￿rst two spec-
i￿cations, while they estimates in Column C are a bit diﬀerent. The estimates
in Table 3 reveal that we have three types of children, of which one is very
unlikely to go to school and accounts for roughly 7.6% of the sample. Given
that attendance rates at young ages are above 90%, it is likely that these are
the children that have not been attending primary school and, for some reason,
would be very diﬃcult to attract to school. Another group, which accounts for
about 40.3% of the sample is much more likely to be in school. The largest
group, accounting for 52.1% of the sample, is the middle one. The locations of
the points of support for the model that assumes separability is a bit diﬀerent,
but we can still identi￿es the three groups we have just discussed.
The loading factor for the ￿rst two models of the unobserved heterogeneity
term is negative as expected. It implies that individuals more likely to have
completed a higher level of schooling by 1997 are also more likely to be attending
in 1998 due to unobserved factors. Perhaps surprisingly, the loading factor for
the third model is positive.
The initial condition edit is modelled, conditional on the unobserved het-
erogeneity, as an ordered probit with age speci￿cc u t o ﬀ points re￿ecting the
fact that diﬀerent ages will have very diﬀerent probabilities to have completed
a certain grade. Indeed, even the number of cutoﬀ points is age speci￿c, to
allow for the fact that relatively young children could not have completed more
3991
AB C
Point of Support 1 -16.064 -15.622 -4.29
0.991 0.975 2.46
Point of Support 2 -19.915 -19.457 -17.62
1.236 1.218 3.144
Point of Support 3 -12.003 -11.616 -0.267
0.768 0.758 2.45
probability of 1 0.519 0.521 0.49
0.024 0.024 0.032
probability of 2 0.405 0.403 0.27
0.025 0.025 0.017
probability of 3 0.075 0.076 0.023
-- -
load factor for initial condition -0.119 -0.124 0.068
0.023 0.023 0.013
Notes: Column A: Eligible dummy only; B: Eligible dummy and
non- Eligible in treatment village dummy. C: Model estimated on
control sample only. Asymptotic standard errors in italics
Table 3: The distribution of unobserved heterogeneity
than a certain grade. To save space, we do not report the estimates of the
cut-oﬀ points. The discrete random term representing unobserved heterogene-
ity is added to the normally distributed random variable of the ordered probit,
eﬀectively yielding a mixture of normals.
In addition to the variables considered in the speci￿cation for school utility,
we include among the regressors the presence of a primary and a secondary
school and the distance from the nearest secondary school in 1997. It is im-
portant to stress that these variables are included in the initial condition model
only, in addition to the equivalent variables for 1998, included in both equations.
As discussed above, these 1997 variables, which enter the initial conditions equa-
tion but not the equation for current schooling utility, eﬀectively identify the
dynamic eﬀect of schooling on preferences. It is therefore comforting that they
are strongly signi￿cant, even after controlling for the 1998 variables. This indi-
40cates that there is enough variability in the availability of school between 1997
and 1998. Taking all coeﬃcients together it seems that the most discriminating
variable is the presence of a primary school in 1997.
The results, which do not vary much across the three columns, also make
sense: children living in villages with greater availability of schools in 1997 are
better educated, children of better educated parents have, on average, reached
higher grades, while children of indigenous households have typically completed
fewer grades. Children from poor households have, on average, lower levels of
schooling. As for the state dummies, which are not reported, all the six states
listed seem to have better education outcomes than Guerrero, one of the poorest
states in Mexico, and particularly so Hidalgo and Queretaro.
We now turn to the variables included in the education choice model, re-
ported in the top panel of Table 5. All the variables, except for the grant and
the wage are expressed as determinants of the cost of schooling, so that a pos-
itive sign on a given variable, decreases the probability of currently attending
school. The wage is expressed as a determinant of the utility of work (so given
t h ep o s i t i v ec o e ﬃcient, an increase in wages decreases school attendance) and
the grant is a determinant of the utility of schooling, so that an increase in it, in-
creases school attendance. In addition, the coeﬃc i e n to nt h eg r a n ti se x p r e s s e d
as a ratio to the coeﬃcient on the wage, so that a coeﬃcient of 1 indicates that
a unitary increase in the grant has the same eﬀect on the utility of school as an
increase in the wage has on the utility of work.18
18The wage has been scaled to be interpreted as the earnings corresponding to the period
covered by the grant. Thus the eﬀects are comparable.
41AB C
poor -0.281 -0.246 -0.280
0.027 0.040 0.051
Ineligible individual in a PROGRESA village - 0.060 -
- 0.040 -
Father￿s education
Primary 0.188 0.189 0.218
0.024 0.024 0.04262
Secondary 0.298 0.298 0.281
0.027 0.028 0.05302
Preparatoria 0.596 0.596 0.499
0.052 0.052 0.09107
Mother￿s education
Primary 0.168 0.169 0.231
0.024 0.024 0.04446
Secondary 0.328 0.329 0.398
0.028 0.028 0.05139
Preparatoria 0.296 0.286 0.334
0.058 0.056 0.09740
indigenous 0.002 0.001 0.133
0.024 0.024 0.04611
Availability of Primary 1997 0.365 0.367 0.691
0.070 0.070 0.19003
Availability of Secondary 1997 0.744 0.741 -0.568
0.173 0.173 0.34909
Km to closest secondary school 97 0.001 0.001 -0.0002
0.003 0.003 0.00007
Availability of Primary 1998 -0.134 -0.144 -0.449
0.113 0.117 0.23524
Availability of Secondary 1998 -0.789 -0.783 0.516
0.172 0.172 0.34776
Km to closest secondary school 98 -0.007 -0.006 0.00015
0.003 0.003 0.00007
Cost of attending secondary 0.005 0.004 -0.00019
0.022 0.022 0.00037
Notes: as in Table 3. State dummies included
Availability means school in the village.
Table 4: Equation for Initial conditions
42AB C
wage 0.103 0.110 0.357
0.033 0.033 0.100
PROGRESA Grant 4.154 3.869 -
1.386 1.036 -
parameter in terminal function ln(α1) 5.798 5.797 6.59
0.099 0.099 0.175
parameter in terminal function ln(α2) -1.104 -1.103 -1.62
0.020 0.020 0.089
Poor 0.159 -0.128 0.431
0.118 0.164 0.274
Ineligible individual in a PROGRESA village -0.492
0.198
Father’s Education - Default is less than primary
Primary -0.131 -0.133 -0.486
0.093 0.092 0.217
Secondary -0.271 -0.267 -0.959
0.113 0.112 0.261
Preparatoria -0.751 -0.735 -2.176
0.253 0.250 0.558
Mother’s Education - Default is less than primary
Primary -0.136 -0.131 -0.870
0.096 0.096 0.233
Secondary -0.137 -0.129 -1.119
0.113 0.113 0.254
Preparatoria -0.920 -0.893 -2.158
0.284 0.283 0.645
indigenous -0.605 -0.591 -1.018
0.107 0.107 0.241
Availability of Primary 1998 2.734 2.744 3.092
0.220 0.219 0.499
Availability of Secondary 1998 -0.160 -0.189 0.789
0.152 0.152 0.425
Km to closest secondary school 98 0.001 0.001 0.00078
0.004 0.004 0.00014
Cost of attending secondary 0.005 0.005 0.013
0.001 0.001 0.0033
Age 2.772 2.758 2.903
0.180 0.180 0.354
Prior Years of education -2.995 -2.996 -3.621
0.214 0.214 0.621
Discount rate 0.89 0.89 0.975
log-Likelihood -26,676.676 -26,672.064 -8862.34
β = State dummies included
Notes as in Table 3.
Table 5: Parameter estimates for the Education choice model
43From a policy perspective, the key parameters of the model are the wage co-
eﬃcient and the coeﬃcient on the grant itself. An increase in the wage decreases
the probability of attending school. On average, the eﬀect of reducing the wage
by 44% (which would roughly give a reduction similar to the average grant to
bene￿ciaries) increases the probability of attending school by 2.1%. This eﬀect
cannot be inferred directly from the value of the parameter alone and has been
obtained from the simulations of the model that we discuss in detail below. The
wage eﬀect is higher when we estimate the model on the control villages alone.
The diﬀerence between the wage coeﬃc i e n ti nc o l u m nAa n dCi ss i g n i ￿cant
and has a t-value of 3.25 based on a Durbin-Wu-Hausman type test.
The value of the grant varies by treatment and control villages (where of
course it is zero) and by grade the child could be attending.19 As mentioned
above, the coeﬃcient of the grant is expressed as a fraction of the wage coef-
￿cient. The values of about 4 for this coeﬃcient reported in Table 5 indicates
that the eﬀect of the grant on school attendance is considerably larger than the
eﬀect of the wage.20 This contrasts with the assumption made in the model by
Todd and Wolpin (2006), where the eﬀect of the grant is assumed to be equal
and opposite to the eﬀect of the wage (suitably scaled). Such an assumption is
easily rejected by a likelihood ratio test.21. As discussed earlier this test rejects
the hypothesis that education and consumption can be taken to be separable
19As mentioned above, in secondary school, the grant is also higher for girls than for boys.
However, as we only estimate the model for the latter, we do not exploit this variation.
20The non-linearity of the model implies that the eﬀect of enrolment is not 3 or 4 times
larger than the eﬀect of enrolment of the wage.
21The likelihood ratio test is 30 and is distributed χ2
(1) under the null. Since this hypothesis
relates to a non-linear restriction and subject to a variety of diﬀerent normalisations the Wald
test is not appropriate. See Gregory and Veall (1985).
44and implies the importance of having experimental information to assess the
impact of policy in this case.
In terms of background characteristics, belonging to a household with less
educated parents leads to lower attendance. This may be a re￿e c t i o no fl i q -
uidity constraints or of diﬀerent costs of schooling. Perhaps surprisingly, the
coeﬃcient on poor (eligible) households is not signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero,
while that on indigenous households indicates that, ceteris paribus, they are
more likely to send their children to school. The states that exhibit the higher
costs are Queretaro and Puebla, followed by San Luis Potosi and Michoacan,
while Veracruz and Guerrero are the cheapest. The costs of attending secondary
measured in either distance (since many secondary schools are located in neigh-
bouring village) or in terms of money have a signi￿cant and negative eﬀect on
attendance.
Both age and grade have a very important eﬀect on the cost of schooling, age
increasing and grade decreasing it. The coeﬃcient on age is the way in which
the model ￿ts the decline in enrolment rates by age across both treatment and
control villages. The eﬀect on the grade captures the dynamics of the model
and, as we discussed, is identi￿ed by the presence of lagged supply of school
infrastructure. We ￿nd a very strong eﬀect of state dependence despite the
fact that we include age as one of the explanatory variables. The pre-existing
level of education is a critical determinant of choice, with increased levels of
education having a substantially positive eﬀect on further participation. This
is of course an important point since it provides an additional mechanism by
which the subsidy may increase educational participation and is likely to be key
for simulating alternative policies. It also implies diﬀerent eﬀects depending on
45the amount of prior educational participation. The likelihood ratio test for the
null that past education does not matter has a p-value of zero (the likelihood
ratio statistic is 300). Moreover, eliminating habits leads to an overprediction
of the program eﬀects.
As we discussed above, we have scant information on the returns to educa-
tion, so that we include the returns to education among the parameters to be
inferred from the diﬀerential attendance rates in school. It is therefore impor-
tant to check what are the returns to education implied by this model. When
we compute the return to education implied by the coeﬃcients on the terminal
value function, we obtain an estimate of the average return to education of 5%
per year, maybe a bit low in the Mexican context, but above the average return
to education observed in our villages.22
Cost variables have the expected sign and are signi￿cant. For instance, an in-
crease in the distance from the nearest secondary school, signi￿cantly decreases
the probability of attending school. Likewise for an increase in the average cost
of attending secondary school. As several of the children in our sample are still
attending primary school we also tried to include variables re￿ecting the cost
and availability of primary schools, but we could not identify any signi￿cant
eﬀect.
7 Simulations
The model is complex and non linear. To check how the various speci￿cations
of the model are able to predict the impact of the grant and to quantify the
eﬀect of the main variables of interest from a policy point of view we present the
22The return is calculated as r =
∂VT
VT ∂ed where VT = V (edi,18) and where the parameters
α1and α2 are given in their logs in column 3 of Table 5.
46results of simulations of various versions of the model. We start. by comparing
the impacts predicted by the diﬀerent versions of the model with the impacts
of PROGRESA as estimated by comparing enrolment rates in treatment and
control localities, as we have done in Section 3. We then study changes to the
program and alternative policies.
7.1 Predicting the impact of PROGRESA
To check how our basic model predicts the impact of the program, we simulate
the behaviour of the children in our sample under two diﬀerent scenarios. The
￿rst correspond to the actual data and includes, in the treatment communities,
the grant. It should be stressed that, in these communities, the grant is assumed
to be permanent. The second is a scenario in which, counterfactually, we set the
grant equal to zero. We then compute the probability of school enrolment of
eligible boys in treatment communities under the two scenarios, average these
probabilities for diﬀerent age groups and interpret the diﬀerent in probabilities
as the impact of the program.
When removing (counterfactually) the grant from treatment areas, we com-
pute two predictions. In one case we keep children wages constant across com-
parisons, assuming that is that the program did not aﬀect wages. This is what
one would calculate based on a partial equilibrium model estimated on the con-
trols only. We label this ￿eﬀect of Grant - No GE￿. In a second calculation,
when we remove the grant we also adjust wages downwards based on our esti-
mates of the impact of the grant on wages. We label this ￿eﬀect of Grant - GE￿.
To these results, plotted in Figure 1. ,we juxtapose the experimental impacts
d i s c u s s e di nS e c t i o n3 .,w h i c hi st h ed o t t e dl i n e .
In column C of Tables 3 to 5, we presented estimates of a model estimated
47on the sample of control villages only. We have already demonstrated that the
eﬀect of the grant is not equivalent to a corresponding reduction of the wage,
which is the opportunity cost of education. We interpret this as a rejection
of separability between consumption and education (see Browning and Meghir,
1991). This in itself implies that a model estimated without the experimental
variation cannot accurately predict the eﬀects of the experiment on educational
participation. In addition to show how our model predicts the impact of the
program, we also want to show the extent to which the rejection of the simpler
model that assumes separability between consumption and child labour, is a
quantitatively important issue.
The left hand side panel in Figure 1 relates to our basic model estimated both
on the treatment and control samples. As we plot the diﬀerence in probabilities
only for eligible children, and as the estimates of most coeﬃcients do not change
much between the two versions of the model (with and without the non-eligible
treatment village dummies), not surprisingly the age pro￿le of the impacts look
very similar. Therefore, in the Figure, we only report one of them.
The right hand side panel in Figure 1. reports the impacts predicted by
the model estimated only on control villages with the separability assumption
imposed. In this case, the impact of the grant is derived from the coeﬃcient on
the wage.
Not surprisingly, the average eﬀect of the treatment (estimated experimen-
tally at 0.05) is predicted quite accurately by the model at 0.047. Moreover, the
model predicts reasonably well the inverted U-shape of the impact. Estimat-
ing the model based on the controls only we obtain an average eﬀect of 0.031.
However, what is more interesting is to consider the age pattern of the eﬀect.
48Consider ￿rst the comparisons that keep wages constant. The age pattern
is very similar to the experimental one, except that the model misses the 14%
peak eﬀect at age 14 and compensates with higher eﬀects around these ages.
The failure of the model to replicate the peak is unsurprising given the simple
and parsimonious functional form we have chosen. On the other hand, when
we consider the predictions from the model estimated based on the sample of
control villages only, we ￿nd that it consistently underestimates the eﬀects of
the program by large amounts. This is because the wage eﬀect is much smaller
than that of the grant, despite the fact that when we estimate the model on the
controls alone we obtain a wage coeﬃcient which is more than twice what we
obtain in the sample including the treatment villages.
The experimental evidence, as shown in the wage regression we discussed
above, showed that the program pushed up children wages by 6%. Thus, com-
paring treatment and control villages does not measure the partial eﬀect of the
subsidy on school participation but includes also the eﬀect that the program
has through its impact on the labour market in the treatment villages. Thus
the appropriate comparison between experimental eﬀects and model predictions
is one that allows for the eﬀect on wages, which is given by the dashed lines
in Figure 1. The impact of correcting the eﬀect for wages is minimal in the
model estimated on the whole sample. As a result the model still compares
well to the experimental eﬀects. However, when we adjust wages in the model
estimated on controls alone the eﬀect decreases substantially. Noting that this
is the most appropriate comparison with the experimental eﬀects, which include
the impact on wages, this result shows that the model estimated on the controls
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Figure 1: Comparing the model estimated on the whole sample and only on the
control sample
50The model estimated on control villages only is similar, if a bit simpler, to
that estimated by Todd and Wolpin (2006). The version we estimated is simpler
in that it does not consider all the details they included in their model. We do
not model, for instance, fertility choices and the like. It should be stressed, how-
ever, that these simpli￿cations do not explain the worse predictive performance
of the model in column C. Indeed, the model we proposed in Column C does
not perform worse, for the age interval 12-15 than the model Todd and Wolpin
(2006) presented for boys.23
We conclude by stressing that our basic model (or its modi￿ed version) seem
to be able to predict the impact of the program better than the Todd and Wolpin
(2006) model. The interpretation of this diﬀerence lies in the speci￿cation of
the model and in particular in the role that non-separability of preferences
c a np l a y .T h ef a c tt h a tT o d da n dW o l p i n(2006) impose separable preferences
might explain why their model fails to predict well the impact of the program
on boys, which constitutes our sample. It also emphasises the potential use of
experimental evidence in estimating structural models.
7.2 Anatomy of PROGRESA and some alternatives.
One of the main advantages of having a structural model, is the possibility of
performing policy experiments. We now use the model to simulate school par-
ticipation under diﬀerent scenarios. First, we compare the eﬀect of the current
program with that of a similar program that diﬀers in the way in which the
grant varies with the grade attended.
The aim of this exercise is to compare the impact of the current grant, as
23Todd and Wolpin (2006) estimate the model for boys and girls. For boys they present
predicted impacts for boys 12 to 15.
51predicted by our model, to the impact that is obtained when the structure of
the grant is changed so as to target the program to those in the most responsive
ages. In particular, we focus on a ￿balanced budget￿ reform of the program. That
is, we increase the grant for children above grade 6 and set it to zero for children
below that grade. The increase for the older children is calibrated so that, taking
into account the response of children schooling choices to the change, the overall
cost of the program is left unchanged (at least for our sample).
W ep l o tt h er e s u l to ft h i se x e r c i s ei nF i g u r e2w h e r ea g a i nw es h o wt h e
results with no wage adjustment (continuous line) and with a GE adjustment.
Performing the GE adjustment is now a bit more complicated than in the
previous exercise. The amount by which children wages would change with the
counterfactual grant structure has to be extrapolated. We do that by using the
elasticities discussed in Section 4.5.
The graph shows that by targeting the grant to the older children we can
almost double the impact relative to the predicted eﬀect from the model shown
in the left panel of Figure 1. This occurs with no eﬀect on the school participa-
tion of the younger primary age children. This is not surprising since the grant
hardly changes their behavior in the ￿rst place because almost all children go
to school below grade 6, making it an unconditional transfer for that age group.
The overall resources targeted to families with children do not change with this
reform, but the incentive structure does.
This change to the grant structure seems to suggest a modi￿cation to the
program that would much improve its ability to increase enrolment rates. This
is particularly important because the modi￿ed program costs, in the steady
state, the same amount as the current one. From the point of view of the
52households, notice that they receive the same amount of resources over time:
what changes is when they receive them. If households can borrow against the
future grant, then the only eﬀect of this reform is to improve incentives for
school participation at later ages. If on the other hand families are liquidity
constrained the tradeoﬀ may be more serious, particularly if the grant at a
younger age aﬀects nutrition or other child inputs.24 Attanasio and Rubio-
Codina (2008) show that the impact of the PROGRESA grant on a variety of
nutritional outcomes for very young children does not depend on whether they
have primary school age siblings. This might be an indication that a change in
t h eg r a n ts t r u c t u r ea st h eo n ed e s c r i b em i g h tn o th a v el a r g en e g a t i v ee ﬀects.
More recently, the Mexican government is piloting two versions of the program
in which primary school grants are eliminated and secondary school grants are
increased.
We next consider a number of alternative experiments. In particular we
consider the eﬀect of decreasing the wage by an amount equivalent to the grant;
the eﬀect of distance to school; and the impact of the grant on children with
low cost of education. All three experiments are summarized in ￿gure ??.I n
all cases we use the model A in the tables. No grant is our baseline.
First we decrease the wage by an amount equivalent to the grant.25 We
see that the eﬀect of the wage is estimated to be much lower than the grant;
for example at age 15 the incentive eﬀect is less than half the one in Figure ??.
This evidence re-emphasises the point already made, that the experimental data
provides information on behaviour that may not be available through observed
24Attanasio and Kaufman (2009) show that for the Oportunidades/PROGRESA popula-
tion, liquidity constraints can be important.
25The reduction is proportional so as to give an average amount equivalent to the grant.
The grant however is additive. So we would not expect the eﬀe c t so ft h ew a g et ob ed i s t r i b u t e d
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Figure 3:
55data.
In the next experiment we demonstrate the eﬀects of a potential school
building program that would reduce the distance of secondary schools to no
more than 3 km. We consider this because it could constitute an alternative
policy to subsidizing participation (although we do not claim that this policy is
equivalent in terms of cost or in terms of other bene￿ts such as better nutrition
and its impact). According to our parameter estimates the eﬀect is modest as
it would increase participation by just below 2 percentage points at age 15.
Finally in order to demonstrate the potential importance of targeting, we
show the eﬀects of the policy on individuals with ￿low cost￿ of schooling; i.e. we
evaluate the eﬀect at the point of support of the unobserved heterogeneity with
the highest school participation. As shown in the graph for these individuals
there is no eﬀect of the program before age 14. Beyond that the eﬀects are
higher than average. Conversely, for the high cost of schooling individuals (not
shown) the eﬀects are higher than average at younger ages and lower later.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we demonstrate the power of using an economic model to analyse
data from a major social experiment, namely PROGRESA in Mexico. Con-
versely, we also show the usefulness of using experimental data to estimate a
structural economic model. The welfare program we consider was originally
applied to rural Mexico and aimed, among other things, at increasing school
enrolment rates among poor children.
We start by showing some of the eﬀects of this program on school participa-
tion. As the program was randomised across villages, inducing truly exogenous
56variation in the incentives to attend school, by oﬀering a subsidy for atten-
dance, estimation of its impact is relatively straightforward. After presenting
some evidence based on simple treatment/control comparisons and diﬀerences
in diﬀerences, we argue that many questions are left unanswered by this type
of techniques and propose the use of a structural model.
By interpreting the data through the viewpoint of a dynamic model one can
investigate how the impacts of the program would be diﬀerent if one were to
change some of its parameters. In particular, we analyze what would happen to
the program￿s impact on enrolment by changing the structure of the grants with
age. This type of analysis is instrumental to the design of eﬀective interventions
and cannot be performed without a well speci￿ed behavioural model. We can
also compare the impacts of the program with alternative policies, such as a
program that would reduce the distance of the households in our sample from
the nearest secondary school. Therefore we show that only through this kind
of modelling approach is it possible to answer questions that are more general
than the speci￿c focus of the evaluation.
But this is not a one way street: we also argue that the use of the experimen-
tal data and the genuine exogenous variation it induces, allows us to identify
models that are much richer than those that could be identi￿e db a s e do ns t a n -
dard observational data. In our speci￿c context, we show that, although the
program operates by changing the relative price of education and its opportunity
cost, the economic incentives it provides are much larger than those provided by
changes in children wages. This is important from a policy point of view, but
also for modelling if one notes that without the experimental variation this type
of model could not be estimated. Our approach provides a rich set of results and
57at the same time points to the importance of the interaction between economic
models and social experiments for the purposes of evaluation and understand-
ing behaviour. In this sense our approach is in the spirit of Orcutt and Orcutt
(1968).
The experimental design of the evaluation data, where the program was ran-
domized across communities, and the fact that the localities in the sample are
relatively isolated, allows one to estimate the ￿general equilibrium￿ eﬀect that
the program has on children wages. Having estimated these eﬀects, we incor-
porate this additional channel in our structural model, both at the estimation
stage (where our estimated wage equation incorporates the GE eﬀects) and in
performing the simulation of alternative interventions.
The model we estimate ￿ts the data reasonably well and predicts impacts
that match the results obtained by the experimental evaluation closely. They
indicate that the program is quite eﬀective in increasing the enrolment of chil-
dren at the end of their primary education, a fact that has been noticed in
several evaluations of conditional cash transfers in Latin America. On the other
hand, the program does not have a big impact on children of primary school
age, partly because enrolment rates for these children are already quite high.
We identify relatively large ￿general equilibrium￿ eﬀects of the program on
child wages: in the treatment localities child wages are about 6% higher than
in control localities. Remarkably, this fact had not been noticed in the large
empirical literature on PROGRESA. Although these eﬀects and the impact
that the program is observed to have on school enrolment (and child labour
supply) imply relatively large elasticities of wages to changes in enrolment, the
attenuating eﬀect on the impact of the grant is not large.
58The heterogeneity of the program impacts by age has suggested the possibil-
ity of changing the structure of the grant, reducing or eliminating the primary
school grant and increasing the size of the grant for secondary school. This
proposal, that has been considered in urban Mexico and in Colombia, can be
analyzed with the help of our structural model. The simulations we perform
indicate that the eﬀect on school participation could be much improved by of-
fering more resources to older children and less to relatively younger one. By
taking into account behavioural responses, we simulate changes to the program
that result in the same amount of resources spent by the program and yet obtain
much larger impacts on school enrolment of older children.
Some words of caution are obviously in order when considering the results
of our simulations. It should be pointed out, for instance, that our model is
silent as to the eﬀect of the grant on other dimensions of child development.
Since most young children go to school anyway, the grant for them is eﬀectively
unconditional and can have other eﬀect such as on their nutrition and result-
ing physical and cognitive development. Although the reformulated grant could
transfer the same resources to the families whose children continued school at-
tendance, albeit with diﬀerent timing the eﬀects on these other dimensions we
do not model could be quite diﬀerent in the presence of liquidity constraints;
moreover fewer resources would end up with those who despite the increased
grant drop out of school anyway. Nevertheless, the point remains that in terms
of school participation, the joint use of the experimental data and the model
suggests that a diﬀerent age structure of the grant would achieve substantially
diﬀerent results.
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Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the locality level.
Table 6: Diﬀerence in diﬀerence estimates - August 1997 - October 1998
10 Appendix: diﬀerence in diﬀerence estimates
of PROGRESA impacts.
In Table 6 we report the estimated impacts of PROGRESA on boy￿s enrollment
for each age from 10 to 16, as well as the average impact for boys aged 10-16 and
for the age group 12-15. The sample we use in the estimation of the structural
model and for Table 2 is slightly diﬀerent because of attrition. To compute the
estimates in Table 6 we use a slightly diﬀerent sample because of the necessity
to use baseline data.
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